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Various authors claim that citizenship norms are changing rapidly in advanced democracies, 
leading to a stronger emphasis on self-expressive engagement and a decline of notions of 
civic duty. In this article, we compare results from two comparative surveys of adolescents: 
the 1999 Civic Education Study and the 2009 International Civic and Citizenship Survey 
(ICCS). By using latent class analysis we identify duty-based and engaged citizenship norms, 
both in 1999 and in 2009. As expected, the group supporting duty-based citizenship norms is 
clearly smaller in 2009 than in 1999, while the opposite is true for the group supporting 
engaged citizenship norms. In contrast to expectations, the empirical evidence also 
distinguishes additional normative concepts, and shows that the distribution among countries 
is not according to the dynamics on value change as suggested in the literature, including a 
decline in engaged norms in Scandinavia and Western Europe. 
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Within industrially advanced societies, political and social norms and attitudes are changing 
rapidly, especially as young age cohorts pay more attention to self-expressive values and to 
the importance of individual freedom (Welzel 2013). This process of value change implies 
that these groups will  relate differently to political systems than previous generations did. 
Traditional ideological cleavages are now less salient, while party membership and electoral 
politics are losing ground among younger age groups (Blais, Gidengil & Nevitte 2004; Blais 
& Rubenson 2013; Klingemann 2015; Whiteley 2011). Simultaneously, however, other forms 
of political and civic engagement are gaining ground, and these forms of engagement are less 
oriented toward electoral politics, but rather to various community, voluntary and social 
movement oriented forms of participation (Flanagan 2013; Inglehart & Catterberg 2002; 
Zukin et al. 2006). These changes do not just signal different organizational preferences, but 
may be the result of changing citizenship concepts (Norris 2011). More specifically various 
authors argue that duty-based citizenship norms are being replaced by a more engaged or 
critical form of citizenship, whereby especially younger age groups place more emphasis on 
actively helping out in their community in a non-institutionalized manner (Dalton 2008; 
Flanagan 2013; Norris 2011; Sloam 2013). Previous studies indeed show that this engaged 
form of citizenship can be identified, and that it is clearly present in at least some Western 
societies (Copeland 2014; Dalton 2007, 2008; Martin 2012; Raney & Berdahl 2009; Shulman 
& Levine 2012). It is assumed that especially in the Scandinavian countries, these norms will 
be strongly present (Dalton & Welzel 2015). 
While there seems to be a consensus in the sociological literature about the occurrence 
of this process of value change, opinions differ on the conceptualization of this process. 
Various authors use different terms to describe this newly emerging citizenship norm, 
including ‘self-actualizing’ (Bennett, 2012), ‘critical’ (Norris 1999, 2011), ‘monitorial’ 
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(Schudson 1998) and ‘engaged’ (Dalton 2007, 2008). Although these terms highlight different 
aspects of citizenship norms, these studies represent a growing consensus that contemporary 
young people are often highly engaged within their communities, while simultaneously they 
de-emphasize traditional duty-based concepts of citizenship. These changes lead to the 
expectation that young age groups will prefer social-movement oriented forms of 
participation, rather than participation that is directed toward electoral politics (Torney-Purta 
2001). Indeed, empirical studies demonstrate such a shift in participation repertoires (Stolle & 
Hooghe 2011), but while these studies are compatible with the broader thesis of value change, 
they cannot be considered as a final test of these theories. If we want to test the claim that 
civic value patterns are changing in Western societies, it is important to investigate the trends 
with regard to these attitudes and values in a more direct and comparative manner. 
The theoretical literature on new citizenship norms emphasizes that value change takes 
place across industrial democracies. Most of the available empirical studies, however, are 
based on cross-sectional observations that do not allow us to test the claim that engaged 
citizenship has become more prevalent (e.g. Dalton 2008) or they investigate over-time 
changes in a single country or region (e.g. Howe 2010; Oser & Hooghe 2013). In this article, 
we aim to investigate in a comparative manner changes over time in citizenship norms. We do 
so using two large surveys among adolescents that were conducted in 1999 and 2009. Both 
the 1999 Civic Education Study and the 2009 International Civic and Citizenship Survey 
included a full battery of items on citizenship norms. This means we can compare the results 
for both studies for the 21 countries that participated in both data gathering efforts, and it also 
allows us to investigate differences between countries with regard to the prevalence of these 
norms. As far as we know, no other broad comparative dataset includes such a comprehensive 
battery on citizenship norms. Most previous studies on this topic opted for an item-based 
analysis of either single-item studies (e.g., Bolzendahl & Coffé 2013) or attitudinal scales 
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(e.g., Dalton 2008). The theory does not only predict support for specific scales, but rather it 
also assumes that actors will have very specific combinations of responses regarding what 
constitutes good citizenship. The theory thus predicts changes at the level of the actor and in 
order to adequately test the theory, this should also be our unit of analysis. We opt therefore 
for an actor-centered analytical technique (latent class analysis) that is explained more fully in 
the methods section of this article. 
In the remainder of this article, we first briefly review the literature on changing 
citizenship norms among young age cohorts, before we present data and methods. We next 
ascertain the characteristics of citizenship norms in both surveys in order to investigate 
changes over time and to investigate differences between countries. In the concluding section, 
we reflect on what our findings tell us about the claim that citizenship norms are rapidly 
changing, especially among young age cohorts. 
 
 
CHANGING CITIZENSHIP NORMS 
 
Just over a decade ago, the prevailing mood in the literature on the civic engagement of young 
age groups was rather pessimistic, as authors claimed that younger age groups are less 
inclined to participate in political and community life (Pharr & Putnam 2000). Other authors, 
however, strongly countered this line of thinking by claiming that new generations do not 
abandon politics, but rather that they reshape the way politics is being performed (Bennett & 
Segerberg 2013; Inglehart & Welzel 2005; Norris 2002; Zukin et al. 2006). These changes are 
well documented with regard to political behavior and participation, demonstrating that 
traditional, electoral forms of participation like voting or party membership are in decline 
among young age groups (Blais & Rubenson 2013; Bolzendahl & Coffé 2013; Fieldhouse et 
al. 2007), while these adolescents and young adults are much more active in non-
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institutionalized or elite-challenging forms of participation (Marien, Hooghe & Quintelier 
2010; Welzel & Deutsch 2012).   
In this literature on the development of participation patterns, a number of authors 
highlight that changing citizenship norms are the main driving force for this process of social 
change (Bennett 2012; Norris 1999, 2002; Dalton 2007, 2008; Schudson 1998). Inglehart and 
Welzel (2005) claim that younger age groups are more critical toward political institutions 
and organizations as they prefer an individualized form of engagement, that allows them to 
express their own individual preferences and inner convictions. According to their ‘human 
development theory’, the fact that education levels and cognitive sophistication are rising 
among this younger age group allows them to develop a far more individualized pattern of 
political preferences in comparison to previous generations. Bennett and Segerberg (2013) 
build on the work of Castells (2000) to argue that young age groups avoid traditional political 
institutions, as they prefer loose and more informal networks. As a result of the emergence of 
new forms of electronically mediated communication networks, an idiosyncratic network 
structure of interaction partners can be established. The ‘critical citizen’ concept (Norris, 
1999, 2011) departs from the assumption that younger age cohorts no longer adopt a 
deferential attitude toward authorities and institutions, but instead develop a more critical 
attitude toward politics, while simultaneously they are staunch supporters of  basic democratic 
values. Among these theories about the nature of political value change, Dalton (2013) offers 
the most explicit claims about the consequences of these changes for political engagement. He 
argues that evolving citizenship norms are guiding political behavior. In his argument, the 
structural change takes place at the level of norms and attitudes, and not at the level of 
behavioral patterns. Following Dalton (2008, 78) we define citizenship norms as ‘a shared set 
of expectations about the citizen’s role in politics.’ The assumption is that these norms guide 
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the behavior of citizens (John, Fieldhouse & Liu 2011; Straughn & Andriot 2011). As Dalton 
claims:  
…the norms of citizenship are vital to understanding the political behavior of the 
American public (…) My central premise is that the social and political modernization 
of the United States – and other advanced industrial democracies – over the past 
several decades has systematically altered the distribution of citizenship norms in 
significant ways (Dalton 2008: 77). 
 
The basic idea in this line of the literature is that citizenship norms held by young age groups 
still stress the importance of an active involvement in social life (Eliasoph 2013; Flanagan 
2013). The difference with previous generations, however, is that norms now depart from 
different motivations. In the past, a sense of civic and moral duty often served as the guiding 
principle (Blais 2000). Even without an intrinsic motivation, civic engagement was simply 
seen as the duty of a citizen because of external pressures, the message by political elites, or 
simple tradition. Partly as a result of cognitive mobilization and higher education levels, this 
unquestioning acceptance of the duty argument, however, has become obsolete as young 
citizens are more critical (Bobek et al. 2009; Norris 2011). Duty-based norms are being 
replaced by what Dalton (2008) labels ‘engaged citizenship’, i.e. an action-based form of 
citizenship where activism in the local community is valued for its own sake. This form of 
intrinsic engagement can also express itself in network and internationally oriented forms of 
engagement (Bennett & Segerberg 2013). These emerging citizenship norm expect less from 
state institutions, as the focus is clearly on what citizens themselves can do without being 
dependent on state intervention. Theoretically this is congruent with the notion of lifestyle 
activism as it was developed in the work of Giddens (1991). 
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The literature on changing citizenship norms relates to broader processes of social 
change. Dalton (2008: 81) argues that the rise of an engaged citizenship norm is a 
consequence of a post-modernization process that leads to the spread of self-expressive values 
(Inglehart & Welzel 2005; Welzel 2013). These values, in turn, lead to the observation that 
‘engaged citizens’ will be more sensitive to issues like human rights, but they will also be less 
deferential toward political authorities and political elites.  
Despite this well-developed literature on changes in citizenship norms comparative 
data over time are scarce. In their reviews of the citizenship norm literature, Bennett (2012) 
and van Deth (2007) note that comparative empirical research on citizenship norms is limited, 
especially outside North America and Europe. Although the literature about the behavioral 
effect of changing citizenship norms relates to changes over time, it is striking to note that the 
empirical support that Dalton marshals for this thesis is based largely on cross-sectional 
observations from the United States (Dalton 2007, 2008). Beyond the U.S., engaged or critical 
citizenship norms have been identified in a number of cross-sectional studies, including 
single-country studies of Canada (Raney & Berdahl 2009) and Australia (Martin 2012), and 
Dalton’s (2007: 138-160) analysis of 19 established democracies. Yet, these studies do not 
inform us about whether engaged citizenship is actually on the rise. Given the general 
literature on value change and cognitive mobilization, this might be expected, especially in 
countries that traditionally score high on postmaterialist indicators (Inglehart 1997), but there 
is no conclusive evidence yet in the literature. While most studies focus on Northern and 
Western Europe, there is far less information available about the spread of the attitudes in 
other geographical regions. 
 
The aim of the current article is to address the question of over-time change by analyzing 
strictly comparative data from 1999 and 2009. If value change in recent years is indeed such a 
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powerful and structural process as Bennett, Dalton, Inglehart, Norris, Welzel and other 
authors argue, a decade should be sufficient to observe significant changes in adolescents’ 
citizenship norms. 
We depart from three main research questions. First, we need to ascertain whether 
these two forms of citizenship norms indeed can be empirically distinguished, both in the 
1999 and the 2009 data. If this is the case, the second research question is whether we observe 
a decline of more traditional, institution- and duty-based citizenship norms and a 
corresponding rise in engaged or critical citizenship norms. The third question is whether the 
engaged citizenship norms are most prevalent in the most affluent and stable democracies, as 
post-modernization theory argues. The 1999 and 2009 data can be used to address these 
questions, since both surveys were conducted among the same age group, used the same 
methodology, and reached comparable levels of representativeness.  
Both surveys were conducted among adolescents, which is ideal for our purpose since 
the literature states that new citizenship concepts will emerge first among younger age groups 
(Eckstein, Noack & Gniewosz 2012; Hooghe & Dassonneville 2013). Although we cannot yet 
adequately investigate participation among adolescents since they are still excluded from 
electoral participation, research shows that citizenship norms can be studied in a meaningful 
and valid manner among adolescents (van Deth, Abendschön & Vollmar 2011). Yet, we also 
need to acknowledge that the democratic ideals of adolescents are still in a developing phase 
(Flanagan 2013) so it remains to be investigated how these norms will change once they enter 
early adulthood. We address this limitation more fully in the discussion section of this article. 
 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
If we want to use survey data to investigate changes over time, it is important that research 
design and data gathering methods are strictly comparable. For this reason, we selected two 
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surveys, both conducted in a similar manner by the International Association for the 
Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA). This organization is responsible for 
comparative evaluation studies of education systems, and in 1999 and 2009 civic education 
was the focus of such an effort, just as in the past IEA conducted tests of students’ language 
and mathematical skills. While these data have not been routinely used in sociological or 
political science research, the school-based approach of the fieldwork ensures a high level of 
representativeness for this age group. 
 Both surveys were conducted in the same manner, as educational authorities in the 
participating countries were responsible for fieldwork and quality control. The survey was 
conducted in school classes, and in most countries educational authorities implemented the 
survey themselves. This design resulted in high response rates, and representative samples for 
the school population of 14 year olds. In 1999, the IEA Civic Education Study (Cived) was 
conducted among 90,000 respondents in 28 countries (Torney-Purta et al. 2001). Ten years 
later, a similar design was followed for the International Civic and Citizenship Education 
Study (ICCS) (Schulz, Ainley & Frailon 2011), this time including information from 140,000 
respondents in 38 countries.  
 Both surveys can be directly compared as they use the same methodology and target 
the same age group. In total 21 countries participated in both surveys, the majority of which 
are in Europe, but with also a few countries in Asia and Latin America. In order to compare 
the 1999 and the 2009 data in a reliable manner we limit the analysis to the following 21 
countries for which we have comparable data: Bulgaria, Switzerland, Chile, Columbia, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, England, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hong Kong, Italy, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Norway, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden.
1
 
The main and unique appeal of these two datasets is that they include a comprehensive battery 
on citizenship norms. A rather straightforward way to analyze this survey would be to 
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construct attitudinal scales (e.g., based on a factor or principal component analysis), and to 
use these as the main dependent variable. Such an approach would be completely valid as a 
research design. However, in the literature on changing citizenship norms it is clear that the 
main concern is about individuals, not about attitudes as such. The expectation is that groups 
of individuals will strongly emphasize one set of values or preferences, while they disregard 
another set. Exactly this combination of preferences renders them ‘engaged’, ‘critical’ or 
‘self-expressive’. If we applied traditional attitude-focused regression analysis, it would be 
impossible to detect this specific combination. For example, with a traditional analysis of 
attitude scales or regression analysis we could arrive at the conclusion that girls score higher 
on civic duty and lower on critical engagement, but these kinds of findings would not mean 
that there is actually a group of girls that make this very distinctive combination. In order to 
test the theory in a valid manner, therefore, rather than focus on the prevalence of an attitude, 
we examine combinational patterns made by specific groups of individuals. This kind of 
actor-centered approach traditionally used cluster analysis, but given the important problems 
with regard to the identification of specific clusters of groups, this kind of approach by now 
has been largely abandoned. In the more recent literature, actor-centered analyses mainly 
relied on latent class analysis or related techniques, as these allow us to identify latent classes 
on the basis of reliable goodness of fit statistics (Collins & Lanza 2010). While latent class 
analysis (LCA) is not yet routinely used in the study of political attitudes, it is by now widely 
applied e.g. in medical sociology, and in this article we use this technique to investigate 
changing citizenship concepts (Hagenaars & Halman 1989; Magidson & Vermunt 2004; 
Yuan et al. 2014).   
In recent years the application of LCA as a probabilistic form of cluster analysis 
became widespread in various fields in the social sciences. The technique allows for the clear 
identification of subgroups within a population, combining a similar set of characteristics 
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(Keel et al. 2004; Wolf et al. 2012). The main difference between LCA (and related 
techniques) and factor analysis is that the grouping of observed data for factor analysis is 
based on the correlation between indicators, whereas for LCA the grouping is based on an 
actor-centered approach that identifies respondents who share similar patterns of answers in a 
survey. In terms of the research interest in this article of identifying groups with specific sets 
of citizenship norms, factor analysis could help us to identify how variables group together 
into separate ‘dimensions of citizenship’ (Dalton 2008: 80-81), whereas LCA can directly 
assess the theory that distinctive groups of people share specific citizenship norms. Model 
selection in LCA is guided by goodness of fit criteria and stability statistics, and this is an 
advantage compared with traditional cluster analysis where the number of clusters often 
depends on rather arbitrary decision rules (Yang 2006). We also use multilevel analysis to 
ascertain whether economic development and democratic stability of a country have an 




Our analysis proceeds in three steps. First we ascertain whether it is possible to identify 
distinct citizenship concepts, both in the 1999 and the 2009 dataset. Subsequently we 
investigate whether the trend over time corresponds to theoretical ideas about value change in 
contemporary society. Third, we analyze differences between countries. 
 
Results: Cived 1999 
In both the 1999 and 2009 surveys, respondents were asked to explain what a good 
citizen is or does. Subsequently the respondent received a list of twelve different activities and 
was requested to rank these activities on a four-point scale of importance: two categories that 
rated the item as not important (‘not important at all’ and ‘not very important’), and two 
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response categories that rated the item as important (‘quite important’ and ‘very important’).2 
In this article, we present LCA findings based on the more parsimonious two-category coding 
that makes a distinction between behaviors that respondents consider to be not important (0) 
and behaviors that respondents consider important (1).  Although this two-category coding 
scheme entails a loss of variance, an important advantage of this coding is that we can be 
confident of cross-country metric equivalence (Agresti, 2007; Kankaraš, Moors & Vermunt, 
2010; Kankaraš & Vermunt, 2014) 
Most of the activities in the scale receive high scores (Table 1). A vast majority of 
respondents considers obeying the law important for a good citizen, but protecting the 
environment, defending human rights or voting in elections are also generally seen as 
important. Discussing politics and party membership, on the other hand, are seen as important 
by only a minority of respondents.  
 
[Table 1 About Here] 
 
A first step in the analysis is to determine the number of latent classes that should be 
distinguished. A crucial advantage of latent class analysis is that the Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC) allows researchers to identify the model (including the number of groups) that 
matches most closely with the structure of the dataset. The BIC can be used to identify a 
unique best model, which obviously was not the case in more traditional cluster analysis 
(Nylund, Asparoutiov & Muthen 2007). Although one model selection approach is to opt for 
the absolute lowest BIC value, in research on complex attitudinal concepts it is common to 
base model selection on a declining BIC, along with the percent change in the likelihood ratio 
chi-square statistic and the classification error (Magidson & Vermunt, 2004: 176-177). Using 
these model selection criteria suggests that five latent classes provide an optimal fit to these 
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data. Models where we try to identify two, three, four or six latent groups do not offer a better 
match with the structure of the data.
3
 A test for measurement equivalence in both observation 
points confirmed the cross-national metric equivalence of the latent classes, which means that 
the citizenship concepts can be validly compared across countries.
4
 In the online appendix we 
document the LCA fit statistics and conditional probabilities findings for all countries 
separately in both observation points. These findings show that fit statistics support the model 
choice considerations in the pooled sample: individual country analyses tend to show a major 
improvement in fit up through the five-cluster model, after which point an increased number 
of classes provides limited improvement in model fit. Regarding the conditional probabilities, 
the findings show an overall stability in the findings based on the two observations. For all 
countries, versions of the five main citizenship norms are present, even though individual 
countries sometimes have idiosyncratic emphases. This analysis therefore confirms the cross-
national and cross-time measurement equivalence of our key theoretical constructs. 
 
[Table 2 About Here] 
 
Three of these latent classes are represented in Figure 1 by grey markers, where the markers 
represent the probability that respondents belonging to that specific latent group consider each 
activity to be (very) important for what an adult good citizen should do. The latent class 
probabilities can be compared with the population mean for each indicator, which is listed in 
parentheses underneath the x-axis. This comparison shows that each one of the classes has a 
unique pattern of combining specific preferences. 
The largest of these groups, including a quarter of the sample, is what we would label 
an ‘all-around’ citizen. This group is distinct because it considers almost every act as 
important. The probabilities are only somewhat lower for protesting, discussing politics and 
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joining a party, but they are still well above average. In contrast, the group we refer to as the 
‘mainstream’ citizen (21 per cent of all respondents) is largely on par with the sample mean 
on the indicators. Although this group has some deviations from the sample mean, such as a 
relatively high emphasis on work and news, and a relatively low emphasis on respect and 
party, this group largely reflects the average scores on indicators for good citizenship. Finally, 
in contrast to the ‘all-around’ citizens, we also find a sizeable group of respondents (16 per 
cent) that has very low average scores. This group has a relatively high emphasis, however, 
on working hard and obeying the law, so in line with traditional political culture research, 
they can be referred to as ‘subjects’ (Almond & Verba 1963).  
 
[Figure 1 About Here] 
 
The two theoretically most interesting groups are represented by black markers with 
connecting lines in Figure 1. As the figure indicates, the two latent classes of engaged and 
duty-based citizens have distinctive normative preferences. For the sake of clarity we will 
refer to those groups as respectively engaged and duty-based citizens. ‘Engaged’ citizens (16 
per cent) are likely to consider the protection of the environment and human rights as 
important, and they also place emphasis on being active in the local community. At the same 
time, however, this group is less likely to consider traditional duty-bound acts to be important, 
such as working, voting, respecting government officials, and joining a party. This group 
therefore most closely represents Dalton’s concept of ‘engaged citizenship’. While their 
emphasis on human rights and the environment is in line with the theories of Inglehart and 
Welzel (2005), their focus on local level civic engagement resembles most closely the ideas 
put forward by Dalton (2008). 
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Likewise, the ‘duty-based’ group (22 per cent) is close to the ideal type of traditional, 
civic duty-based citizenship. In contrast to the engaged citizens, this group emphasizes 
traditional acts like voting, showing respect, and watching the news. Even though the duty-
based citizens have an active sense of traditional political duty, they do not highly value 
protecting the environment and human rights. As such, this group emphasizes the importance 
of institutionalized and electoral politics, while it does not pay much attention to typical 
postmodern sensitivities. Although the work of Norris (2011) does not refer explicitly to this 
rather traditional group, it is clear that their preferences are exactly the opposite from what 
she labels as ‘critical citizens’.  
This analysis of the Cived 1999 data confirms the empirical validity of two sets of 
citizenship norms that can be referred to as engaged and duty-based. It has to be noted, 
however, that the engaged and duty-based groups combined amount to only 38 per cent of all 
respondents. Almost two-thirds of the respondents in 1999 do not hold these citizenship 
norms. Rather surprisingly, 16 per cent of respondents adhere to very traditional citizenship 
norms, by emphasizing obeying the law and working hard.  
 
Results: ICCS 2009 
 
Subsequently, we proceed in the same manner, with the 2009 ICCS survey data. When 
looking at the frequencies (Table 3), a first observation is that there is not much difference in 
comparison to the 1999 results (Table 1). Obeying the law remains the most-often mentioned 
item, while party membership remains lowest on the priority list. For all twelve items the 
differences between the scores in 1999 and those in 2009 remain rather limited, and at first 
sight a simple look at the population averages might suggest stability over this ten year 




[Table 3 About Here] 
 
 
As in our analysis of the ICCS 2009 data, we first determine the optimal number of latent 
classes. Goodness-of-fit measures again indicate a clear preference for a five latent classes 
solution which allows for a valid comparison over time. 
 
[Table 4 About Here] 
 
In Figure 2, five latent classes are plotted for the 2009 data, which in many ways parallel the 
1999 findings. Again, the ‘all-arounders’ are the largest group (35 percent of all respondents). 
As ten years earlier, members of this group tend to answer that everything is important, and 
they have the highest probabilities to consider every single item to be important. It can be 
noted, however, that in 2009 this group places less emphasis on party membership and 
engaging in political discussions. While in 1999, 65 percent of the group members considered 
party membership to be important, this was down to 51 per cent in 2009.  
While the ‘engaged’ group only amounted to 16 percent of all respondents in 1999, 
this group increases to 30 per cent in 2009. This sharp rise supports the claim that engaged 
citizenship norms are on the rise in contemporary society. The profile of the engaged group is 
very similar in both surveys, with high scores for human rights, the environment and being 
active in the local community, while this group remains skeptical about voting and joining a 
political party. The group of engaged citizens is thus very similar in both surveys, but it 
almost doubles in size compared to the 1999 results. As far as we know, this is the very first 
time the rise of engaged citizenship norms has been demonstrated in an unequivocal manner 
for such a broad range of countries. 
A third group identified in the analysis is the duty-based citizens, and this group falls 
from 22 per cent in 1999 to 15 per cent in 2009. The group is again characterized by high 
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scores for voting and respecting authority, but protecting rights and the environment and 
being active in the local community become even less important for this group. Again in 2009 
we see a ‘mainstream citizens’ cluster which roughly echoes the emphases of the population 
average, though this group is smaller in 2009. Finally, the percentage of ‘subjects’ declines 
from 16 to six per cent, and they remain attached to obeying the law and working hard. 
 
[Figure 2 About Here] 
 
In sum, both in 1999 and in 2009 distinctive groups of engaged and duty-based citizens could 
be identified, together with three additional groups (i.e., the all-around, mainstream and 
subject groups). At first sight, these findings confirm our claim that it was appropriate to use 
an actor-based form of analysis. However, the question remains: did the use of latent class 
analysis lead to theoretically superior results, compared to a more standard attitude-based 
analysis? To assess this, we conducted an additional analysis that relies purely on a factor 
analysis. Factor analyses based on the data from 1999 and 2009 show that all items load 
primarily on one factor. In both 1999 and 2009 the main component has a very large 
eigenvalue (2.612 in 1999 and 2.856 in 2009) while the other two components have 
eigenvalues close to 1.0. In both observations, the first factor explains more than twice the 
variance as the next largest factor. These findings corroborate Bolzendahl and Coffé’s (2013: 
69) report that a factor analysis of the 25 Eastern and Western European countries in the 
International Social Survey Programme in 2004 led to just one factor which lumped together 
various citizenship items. A closer look at the latent class analysis findings shows why a 
traditional factor analysis is so inconclusive. The huge percentage of all-around and 
mainstream group respondents (almost half of the total sample in both measurements) 
attributes high values to a wide range of items, and this leads to one large and theoretically 
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unsatisfactory factor where all items are lumped together. The factor analysis is completely 
dominated by this group, so that it does not allow us to observe what goes on in the other 
smaller groups that are of theoretical interest in this paper. The latent class analysis, on the 
other hand, is much more precise in this crucial aspect and it allows us to gain new insights in 
this process of value change among specific groups of the population. 
 
 
Results: Comparison 1999-2009 
 
The previous results indicated that duty-based and the engaged citizenship norms can be 
empirically distinguished, both in 1999 and 2009. We have also seen that engaged citizenship 
norms became more prevalent, while the opposite trend has been observed for duty-based 
citizenship norms. We emphasize, however, that in both observation periods more than half of 
the respondents do not fit into either of these two categories. While much of the theoretical 
literature is focused only on engaged and duty-based groups , it is important to remember that 
in a wide variety of industrialized democracies young people continue to adhere to other 
norms, including very traditional ones.  
 
As we focus on comparing the engaged and duty-based groups in 1999 and 2009, Figures 3 
and 4 show that these norms are largely similar in both observations, but that we can also 
observe some subtle changes. For the engaged citizens (Figure 3) human rights and the 
environment remain of paramount importance, but we can observe that discussing politics is 
rated slightly lower in 2009. Knowing the history of one’s country on the other hand, receives 
a higher rating than in 2009. The main defining elements of the engaged citizenship norm are 
almost identical in both observations, strengthening the argument that this concept can be 




[Figure 3 About Here] 
 
In Figure 4, we compare the characteristics of the duty-based norm. In general, this group 
rates the various acts lower in 2009 than it did in 1999, so it seems that even among this group 
the idea of a ‘duty’ to perform these acts gets weaker. Defining characteristics of this group 
endure, however, such as respecting authority, and working hard (which has an even higher 
likelihood in 2009). So while the group of duty-based citizens becomes smaller, it develops a 
more distinct normative profile, with stronger differences between acts that are considered 
important and those that are not. 
 
[Figure 4 About Here] 
 
 
In sum, our first research question whether engaged and duty-based citizenship norms can be 
empirically identified was confirmed. In both 1999 and in 2009 the LCA indicated that both 
of these norms are present, with rather small differences regarding the relative emphases of 
these norms in both observations. The second research question also can be answered in an 
affirmative manner (Figure 5): the proportion of engaged citizens rises (from 15 to 30 per 
cent) while the duty-based citizenship norms loses support (from 22 to 15 per cent). These 
findings support the claim that the decline of duty-based citizenship and the accompanying 
rise of engaged citizenship are present across industrialized democracies. 
 






Results: Comparative Analysis 
Thus far, we have presented analyses for a wide range of 21 different societies, but these 
trends should also be investigated in a comparative manner. It is relevant to determine 
whether similar trends can be found in all of these countries separately. First we present an 
overview of our findings that compares geographical regions. In most of the literature on 
value change in contemporary society, it is assumed that especially the Scandinavian 
countries and Western Europe will be frontrunners in the trend toward new normative 
sensitivities, such as support for human rights or the environment. The figures in Table 5 
show that this was indeed still the case in 1999: the engaged citizenship concept was most 
strongly present in the Scandinavian countries (with 37 percent of all respondents) and in 
Western Europe (30 percent of all respondents), while less than 10 percent of respondents 
adhered to this norm in other regions, including Mediterranean Europe, Central and Eastern 
Europe, and South America and Asia. The 1999 results thus clearly follow the pattern we 
would expect based on the literature with regard to postmateralism. For 2009, however, it can 
be observed that this trend reversed, with a decline of engaged citizenship in the Scandinavian 
countries and Western Europe and a simultaneous rise of engaged citizenship in all other 
regions. This distribution clarifies that some of the conventional wisdom about more 
contemporary value orientations being present mainly in Northern and Western Europe no 
longer seem to be valid in the most recently available figures. Especially the countries in Asia 
and Latin America seem to have experienced a rapid transition toward more engaged 
citizenship norms among adolescents, although it has to be acknowledged that the number of 
participating countries in those remains limited. 
 




The country-specific findings challenge an assumption often made in this line of 
research that changes in citizenship norms and political attitudes follow a typical pattern 
where Nordic countries take the lead, while newly emerging democracies are slower to adapt 
to the new trends (Inglehart, 1997). In the appendix we list the country figures for the 
distribution of the citizenship norms, both in 1999 and in 2009 (Tables A1 and A2). These 
findings show that in the Cived study in 1999, the assumption about the geographic 
distribution of this trend is still rather valid as we find the highest proportion of engaged 
citizens in Nordic countries like Denmark, Norway and Sweden. In 2009, however, these 
citizenship norms can equally be found in Latin America or the Baltic states, and the Nordic 
countries are no longer exceptional. The theoretical relevance is that while Northern and 
Western Europe traditionally have been depicted as frontrunners in the trend toward new 
citizenship norms, at least among adolescents their position clearly is no longer exceptional. 
In order to test these differences between countries in a more rigorous manner, we 
conducted a multilevel regression analysis, including both individual and country level 
independent variables. On the individual level, we keep the information to a minimum, by 
including for only gender and socio-economic status. In this kind of data, it is usually not 
possible to obtain reliable information from the adolescent respondents about family income 
or professional status of the parents. Therefore, a routine solution is to ask adolescents about 
the number of books at home as a proxy for socio-economic status. On the country level, we 
include the years of stable democracy and GDP per capita (Inglehart & Catterberg, 2002). 
Given the fact that the number of observations on the country level is limited, both indicators 
had to be included one by one. In line with the literature, our hypothesis is that both 
democratic stability and economic status will have a positive effect on engaged citizenship 
and a negative one on duty-based citizenship. 
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The results of the multilevel regression analysis (Table 6) confirm expectations for the 
1999 data (see appendix for descriptive statistics). For duty-based citizenship there is a 
significantly negative effect of both the years of stable democracy and the GDP per capita, 
while we find exactly the opposite relation for engaged citizenship in 1999. When we 
subsequently conduct the same analysis for the 2009 data, we obtain exactly the opposite 
result, with less engaged citizenship in countries with a long history of stable democracy and 
high economic development level. Our finding that the Scandinavian and established Western 
European countries have lost their front runner position in this regard is thus confirmed by the 
results of this comprehensive multilevel regression test. At least among adolescents, the 
spread of new citizenship norms seems to have become a more global phenomenon, that is no 
longer concentrated in specific geographic regions. 
 
[Table 6 About Here] 
DISCUSSION 
In this study, we conduct a major comparative analysis of trends in citizenship norms in 21 
countries, exploiting the availability of new survey data on citizenship norms among 
adolescents. One of the advantages of working with these data is that they allow for a rigorous 
research design that maps trends over time in an empirically valid manner.  
The results of the study largely confirm the claims put forward in the literature on 
value change. First, both engaged and duty-based citizenship norms can be identified in an 
empirically valid manner, and secondly, we can observe that engaged citizenship is on the rise 
while duty-based citizenship is declining. Even more strongly than the literature expects, 
these findings indicate a very general trend that is also present in Latin American and in 
Central and Eastern Europe. Value change thus indeed proceeds in the way authors like 
Inglehart, Norris, Schudson and Dalton suggested. Simultaneously, however, a very large part 
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of the sample does not fit into this theoretical framework, and respondents in the largest of 
these groups have the tendency to state that everything is important. This ‘all-around’ group is 
even so large that in a factor-based regression analysis, it overwhelms the entire pattern. An 
actor-centered analytical technique like latent class analysis is required to detect the 
occurrence of the smaller groups that are central in the theoretical literature. Our findings 
show that while these ‘pioneer’ groups may be highly relevant from a theoretical point of 
view, they do not constitute a majority among this age group. 
Our findings deviate from Dalton’s claim, however, in a different manner. What we 
can observe from a direct comparison between these data in 1999 and 2009 is that there is 
very little change in the overall importance attached to the various items. Adolescents in 2009 
state that voting and obeying the law are of the utmost important for being a good citizen, just 
like their counterparts did in 1999. The importance of these ‘traditional’ acts of good 
citizenship did not diminish. What does differ, however, is the way adolescents consider these 
traditional acts to be important when examined as part of a broader citizenship norm that 
simultaneously takes other aspects of good citizenship into account. When we analyze these 
data, we observe that the group that emphasizes the importance of voting and obeying the law 
becomes a smaller proportion of the population, in favor of groups that have different 
priorities for good citizenship. So, while our analysis supports the trend toward the increased 
prevalence of ‘engaged citizenship’, we can also see that more traditional and institutionalized 
acts of citizenship participation, like voting, are still considered as important and will not be 
easily replaced in the near future.  
The evidence for the geographical distribution of citizenship norms across countries is 
rather mixed. For the 1999 data expectations were confirmed, as we did find the highest 
prevalence of engaged citizenship norms in Scandinavia, and in other countries with a stable 
democratic tradition and a high economic development level. Ten years, later, however, this 
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pattern is reversed. This questions the theoretical assumption that the trend toward post-
materialist value orientations can be regarded as a purely linear process. Apparently other 
countries caught up with the high levels that were already present in the Scandinavian 
countries more than a decade ago. Tentatively, this could indicate that at least among 
adolescents, the Scandinavian countries have lost their exceptional status, and that the spread 
of these new norms has become a much more global phenomenon. It has to be remembered, 
however, that we have few countries from these regions in our dataset, so that broader data 
are necessary to arrive at a more comprehensive assessment of these trends. An alternative 
plausible explanation for this trend might be that the questions also probe into what 
adolescents consider to be most salient. For adolescents in Scandinavia, protecting the 
environment or human rights might not be considered as highly salient, because the 
governments in those countries have already taken numerous initiatives to incorporate these 
sensitivities in their policies. For the adolescents in Latin America, on the other hand, this 
might seem a highly salient issue, exactly because adequate government policy is missing. To 
what extent this is not just a plausible, but also a likely explanation, however, still needs to be 
investigated. 
A number of caveats are in order. First, while the identified citizenship norms are 
remarkably similar in both surveys, they are obviously not identical. The most characteristic 
items, however, do remain firmly in place, thereby confirming that a comparison over time is 
warranted. The analysis suggests, however, that duty-based citizenship not only becomes less 
prevalent over the observation period, but also that the specific element of ‘duty’ become 
diluted as members of this group are less likely in 2009 to consider a whole range of duty-
based acts as important. In addition, it is worth emphasizing that both surveys were conducted 
among adolescents, and we wish to elaborate upon our prior observation there are different 
positions in the literature about the theoretical status of political attitudes among adolescents. 
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The remarkable stability of the 1999 and 2009 LCA solutions, suggests that these adolescents 
did not respond in a random manner, but that there is a distinct pattern in their answers. In line 
with previous research, these findings indicate that citizenship norms can be measured in a 
valid manner among adolescents.  
A question remains, however, regarding the relationship between normative beliefs of 
adolescents and their adult counterparts. On the one hand, some authors make the point that 
there tends to be a strong pattern of stability between adolescence and early adulthood 
(Quintelier & Hooghe 2012). Following this assumption would allow us to predict that the 
adolescent respondents in these surveys to a large extent will continue to have the same 
political preferences as they mature into adulthood. On the other hand, authors in the field of 
developmental psychology suggest that adolescents are still in developmental phases in the 
lifecycle, during which actors continue to develop their moral and cognitive concepts and 
identities (Flanagan 2013). This line of the literature would suggest that there will be 
important differences between the citizenship concepts of adults and adolescents. For 
example, the large proportion of respondents that highly value obeying the law is consistent 
with traditional findings in developmental psychology that authority beliefs are strong among 
this age group (Smetana & Turiel 2003). Since we are unaware of any comparative dataset 
among adults that includes a similar over-time battery of citizenship concepts, it remained 
beyond the scope of this article to investigate or explain differences between adolescents and 
adults.  In future research, it would be highly relevant to make such a direct comparison 
between citizenship concepts among adolescents and adults, as only such a test provides the 
necessary information to ascertain whether our finding could be generalized toward a larger 
population.  
Our findings generate a number of new research questions. In line with Dalton’s 
change thesis, we can observe that the group that finds it important to defend human rights 
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and to work in the local community has become larger over time. Yet, it remains to be seen 
whether and how this preference for local and non-institutionalized participation enables the 
establishment of a meaningful linkage mechanism between citizens and the political system. 
Various authors have already documented how political decision-making tends to shift toward 
a higher geographic scale as a reaction to economic and ecological demands (Stiglitz 2007). 
Simultaneously, however, the citizens of tomorrow, as we might label these adolescents, 
increasingly seem to prefer local and non-institutionalized engagement. One cannot help but 
wonder how effective this form of engagement can be, and if in fact ‘engaged citizenship’ 





                                                 
1
. Belgium took part in both surveys but in 1999 only French language schools participated, 
and in 2009 only Dutch language schools. Therefore, Belgium was left out of the comparison. 
 
2
. The 1999 questionnaire also included ‘willing to serve in the military to defend the country’ 
as a possible act, but this question was not repeated in the 2009 questionnaire and was 
therefore left out of the analysis presented in this article. When we do include this item for the 
1999 analysis, the findings are in line with our theoretical expectations for the duty-based and 
engaged citizenship norms: in comparison to the average respondent, engaged citizens are less 
likely to be willing to serve in the military, whereas the duty-based group is more willing. 
 
3
 Although one could argue that the 6-class solution adds model fit value, the advantage is 
minimal in terms of the goodness of fit statistics. Our investigation of the substantive solution 
of the 6-class model revealed why this is so: the additional sixth cluster that is gained simply 
splits the duty-based cluster into two separate duty-based groups that are differentiated only 
by one group’s slightly higher overall conditional probabilities. In addition to the fit statistics, 
therefore, the theoretical insights gained in the transition to the 6-cluster model do not justify 




 These measurement equivalence tests follow the logic and syntax detailed in Kankaras, 
Moors & Vermunt (2010). Evidence of metric measurement equivalence is found when the 
partial equivalence model has a BIC that is lower than the hetergoenous model. Metric 
equivalence was supported by findings for the 1999 data (BIC for heterogenous model =  
578793; for partial equivalence model = 572275) and for the 2009 data (BIC for heterogenous 
model = 792306; for partial equivalence model = 786543). Additional tests for scalar 
equivalence (i.e. whether citizenship items have the same intercept across countries) indicated 
that the model lacks scalar equivalence. By retaining direct effects for each item in the model, 
LCA allows the intercept for the items to vary for each country, which enables valid cross-
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Table 1. Frequency of Good Citizenship Acts in Cived 1999 
In this section there are some statements that could be used to explain what a good adult citizen is 
or what a good adult citizen does: 
Obeys the law, votes in every election, joins a political party, works hard, would participate in a peaceful protest against a 
law believed to be unjust, knows about the country’s history, follows the political issues in the newspaper, on the radio or on 
tv, participates in activities to benefit people in the community, shows respect for government representatives, takes part in 
activities to promote human rights, engages in political discussions, in activities to protect the environment. 
  obey rights local work envir vote history respect news protest discuss party 
Mean .95 .84 .83 .81 .81 .80 .73 .72 .72 .68 .44 .31 
N 70451 67854 68617 68822 69054 69879 69026 67765 69078 65140 66166 66651 
Std. 
Deviation 
.212 .363 .375 .394 .389 .400 .446 .449 .450 .467 .496 .462 
Order 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Source: Cived 1999, 21 countries, n= 72,543. Entries are proportion of the respondents considering this act as 











Table 2.  LCA Model Fit Statistics for Citizenship Norms in 1999 
  BIC(LL) L² % change L² Class. Err. 
1-Class 639326 52627 
 
0.00 
2-Class 603265 16425 -0.69 0.11 
3-Class 598406 11424 -0.78 0.18 
4-Class 596635 9512 -0.82 0.23 
5-Class 595191 7927 -0.85 0.26 
6-Class 594125 6719 -0.87 0.29 
Source: Cived 1999. BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion; LL = log likelihood; L²=likelihood ratio chi-square 
statistic. LCA findings using Latent Gold 4.5 software (Vermunt and Magidson 2005). Entries are test statistics 
for latent class models identifying one and more clusters of respondents. Additional commonly used test 
statistics were estimated (AIC AIC3, CAIC3) and were all in agreement with the BIC and the per cent change in 





Table 3. Frequency of Good Citizenship Acts in ICCS 2009 
Report: How important are the following behaviours for being a good adult citizen? 
Joining a political party, learning about the country’s history, following political issues in the newspaper, on the radio, on TV 
or on the internet [Note: Internet was not mentioned in Cived 1999], showing respect for government representatives, 
engaging in political discussions, participating in peaceful protest against laws believed to be unjust, participating in activities 
to benefit people in the local community, taking part in activities promoting human rights, taking part in activities to protect 
the environment, working hard, always obeying the law.’ 
 
  obey rights local work envir vote history respect news protest discuss party 
Mean .89 .82 .79 .80 .84 .79 .77 .77 .73 .62 .40 .28 
Difference 
in 2009 
-.06 -.02 -.04 -.01 +.03 -.01 +.04 +.05 +.01 -.06 -.04 -.03 
N 73421 73210 73214 73320 73284 73711 73153 73411 73463 73174 73279 73430 
Std. 
Deviation 
.314 .381 .405 .400 .367 .404 .422 .424 .444 .484 .490 .448 
Order: 1 3 6 4 2 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Source: ICCS 2009, 21 countries, n=75,020. Entries are proportion of the respondents indicating that this 
behavior is (very) important for a good citizen. Indicators ordered from left to right in the same order as the 




Table 4. LCA Model Fit Statistics for Citizenship Norms in 2009 
 
 
BIC(LL) L² % change L² Class. Err. 
1-Class 894867 91113   0.00 
2-Class 840078 36178 -0.60 0.10 
3-Class 827149 23104 -0.75 0.15 
4-Class 821190 17000 -0.81 0.20 
5-Class 817354 13019 -0.86 0.22 
6-Class 814928 10448 -0.89 0.26 
Source: ICCS 2009. BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion; LL = log likelihood; L²=likelihood ratio chi-square 
statistics. LCA findings using Latent Gold 4.5 software (Vermunt and Magidson 2005). Entries are test statistics 
for latent class models identifying one and more clusters of respondents. Additional commonly used test 
statistics were estimated (AIC AIC3, CAIC3) and were all in agreement with the BIC and the per cent change in 




Table 5. Trends in Citizenship Norms across Regions of the World 
   
            





Central & Eastern 
Europe 
South America & 
Asia 
 Prevalence of Engaged Norms 
1999 0.37 0.30 0.08 0.09 0.07 
2009 0.28 0.18 0.14 0.34 0.42 
 Prevalence of Duty-Based Norms 
1999 0.03 0.10 0.34 0.19 0.34 
2009 0.28 0.28 0.08 0.12 0.08 
Source: CivEd 1999; ICCS 2009. Note: percentage of all respondents adhering to one of the norm groups, for 
1999 and 2009 based on LCA findings. Scandinavia: Denmark, Finland, Norway & Sweden; Western 
Eur.:Switzerland, England; Mediterr.: Cyprus, Greece, Italy; Central & Eastern: Bulgaria, Czech Rep.; 





Table 6. Multilevel Regression Model, Determinants of Duty-based and Engaged Norms 
1999 Duty I Duty II Duty III Engaged I Engaged II Engaged III 
Individual level       
 Female 0.143*** 0.150*** 0.154*** 0.247*** 0.218*** 0.214*** 
 (0.034) (0.016) (0.015) (0.023) (0.016) (0.015) 
 SES proxy
a       
  101-200 books -1.003*** 0.091*** 0.076*** 0.577*** 0.005 -0.003 
 (0.045) (0.021) (0.021) (0.030) (0.021) (0.021) 
  201 books+ -0.943*** 0.109*** 0.086*** 0.647*** -0.032 -0.047** 
 (0.041) (0.020) (0.020) (0.028) (0.020) (0.019) 
Country level       
 Democracy  -0.057**   0.040***  
  (years stable)  (0.028)   (0.015)  
 GDP per capita   -0.013*   0.010*** 
   (0.007)   (0.003) 
 Constant -3.486*** -4.159*** -4.181*** -4.134*** -3.727*** -3.750*** 
 (0.028) (0.861) (0.831) (0.019) (0.446) (0.426) 
       
 Observations 71,613 66,724 71,613 71,613 66,724 71,613 
 Number of groups  20 21  20 21 
 
2009 Duty I Duty II Duty III Engaged I Engaged II Engaged III 
Individual level       
 Female 0.184*** 0.196*** 0.204*** 0.582*** 0.570*** 0.564*** 
 (0.023) (0.019) (0.019) (0.025) (0.023) (0.022) 
 SES proxy
a       
  101-200 books 0.298*** 0.057** 0.052** -0.026 0.209*** 0.205*** 
 (0.029) (0.025) (0.025) (0.032) (0.029) (0.029) 
  201 books+ 0.254*** -0.049* -0.055** -0.245*** 0.098*** 0.085*** 
 (0.029) (0.025) (0.025) (0.032) (0.030) (0.029) 
Country level       
 Democracy  0.024**   -0.017*  
  (years stable)  (0.011)   (0.010)  
 GDP per capita   0.003**   -0.002* 
   (0.001)   (0.001) 
Constant -4.013*** -3.944*** -3.896*** -2.386*** -2.537*** -2.597*** 
 (0.018) (0.330) (0.321) (0.020) (0.315) (0.307) 
       
Observations 73,890 71,111 73,890 73,890 71,111 73,890 
Number of groups  20 21  20 21 
Source: CivEd 1999; ICCS 2009. Entries are results of multilevel regression analysis with standard errors in 
parentheses. Dependent variables are conditional probability of duty-based or engaged-membership, logged. 
a 






Figure 1. Citizenship Norms in 1999, Highlighting ‘Engaged’ and ‘Duty-based’ 
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All-around (25% of the population) Duty-based (22% of the population)
Mainstream (21% of the population) Engaged (16% of the population)
Subject (16% of the population)
y=conditional 
probabilities 
for each latent 
class 
x=indicators included in the LCA, ordered by descending means in the Cived 1999 sample population (means noted in parentheses) 
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Figure 2. Citizenship Norms in 2009, Highlighting ‘Engaged’ and ‘Duty-based’ 
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 40 
 
Figure 3. Comparing the ‘Engaged’ Citizenship Norm in 1999 and 2009 
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Figure 4. Comparing the ‘Duty-based’ Citizenship Norm in 1999 and 2009 
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Engaged      
(16%) 
Bulgaria 0.31 0.13 0.26 0.25 0.05 
Switzerland 0.14 0.30 0.05 0.23 0.29 
Chile 0.26 0.53 0.14 0.07 0.00 
Columbia 0.49 0.28 0.00 0.02 0.20 
Cyprus 0.42 0.55 0.00 0.03 0.00 
Czech Republic 0.07 0.05 0.40 0.22 0.26 
Denmark 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.23 0.61 
England 0.14 0.00 0.26 0.31 0.29 
Estonia 0.06 0.13 0.41 0.30 0.10 
Finland 0.06 0.00 0.51 0.40 0.03 
Greece 0.51 0.37 0.03 0.03 0.05 
Hong Kong 0.35 0.07 0.33 0.21 0.04 
Italy 0.27 0.19 0.25 0.12 0.17 
Lithuania 0.34 0.34 0.08 0.11 0.12 
Latvia 0.14 0.24 0.27 0.25 0.09 
Norway 0.16 0.00 0.21 0.10 0.52 
Poland 0.37 0.52 0.02 0.09 0.00 
Russia 0.11 0.07 0.53 0.21 0.09 
Slovak Republic 0.29 0.00 0.61 0.06 0.04 
Slovenia 0.15 0.41 0.02 0.26 0.16 
Sweden 0.19 0.08 0.18 0.23 0.32 
Source: Cived 1999. Note: Entries are the proportion of respondents estimated to belong to a latent class as 

















Bulgaria 0.28 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.58 
Switzerland 0.23 0.33 0.20 0.09 0.15 
Chile 0.36 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.47 
Columbia 0.39 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.51 
Cyprus 0.50 0.05 0.31 0.05 0.08 
Czech Republic 0.18 0.09 0.06 0.12 0.55 
Denmark 0.20 0.52 0.03 0.08 0.16 
England 0.41 0.22 0.08 0.08 0.21 
Estonia 0.21 0.19 0.10 0.06 0.44 
Finland 0.18 0.25 0.02 0.13 0.42 
Greece 0.35 0.01 0.35 0.03 0.26 
Hong Kong 0.58 0.24 0.02 0.04 0.12 
Italy 0.68 0.18 0.06 0.01 0.07 
Lithuania 0.38 0.22 0.18 0.04 0.18 
Latvia 0.36 0.08 0.42 0.04 0.09 
Norway 0.56 0.10 0.09 0.04 0.21 
Poland 0.42 0.12 0.24 0.05 0.17 
Russia 0.52 0.16 0.14 0.04 0.15 
Slovak Republic 0.17 0.09 0.17 0.10 0.46 
Slovenia 0.23 0.10 0.16 0.11 0.40 
Sweden 0.26 0.14 0.08 0.14 0.38 
Source: ICCS 2009. Note: Entries are the proportion of respondents estimated to belong to a latent class as 







Table A3. Descriptive Statistics of Variables in Multilevel Regression Analyses 
  2009 N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Female 74308 0.51 0.50 0 1 
SES proxy
a 
74173 1.61 0.80 1 3 
Democracy (years)
b 
72118 40.92 30.65 0 90 
GDP per capita
c
 75020 313.87 241.40 51.74 1025.26 
      1999 N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Female 71948 0.52 0.50 0 1 
SES proxy 71812 1.67 0.84 1 3 
Democracy (years) 67546 34.13 29.67 0 82 
GDP per capita 72543 143.92 120.40 16.23 393.04 
 
Source: Cived 1999 and ICCS 2009. Notes:  
a. SES proxy is the self-reported number of books at home that includes the following categories: (1) 0-100 
books (2) 101-200 books (3) 201+ books. 
b. Democracy (years): based on the POLITY IV 2011 dataset for 1998 and 2008, and includes the total number 
of years that the country scored 8 or higher on the 10-point democracy index (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers, 
2011). 
c. Based on the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook Database, annual data for 1998 and 
2008 (International Monetary Fund, 2013). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
